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    • List of Articles Ṭūsī

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        1 - A Study of the Views of Three Muslim Philosophers on the Four-Fold Virtues: Ibn Miskawayh, Khwājah Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī, and Ḥakīm J‘afar Kashfī
        Masoud  Sadeghi amir jalali
        Ibn Miskawayh, Khwājah Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī, and Ḥakīm J‘afar Kashfī share relatively similar views on the soul and believe in Aristotle’s middle term. Moreover, all of them consider the four-fold virtues of wisdom, bravery, piety, and justice to be the most original moral More
        Ibn Miskawayh, Khwājah Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī, and Ḥakīm J‘afar Kashfī share relatively similar views on the soul and believe in Aristotle’s middle term. Moreover, all of them consider the four-fold virtues of wisdom, bravery, piety, and justice to be the most original moral virtues; however, they also have some disagreements with each other. This paper, while trying to accurately explain the similarities between them, aims to carefully investigate the differences among them regarding the mentioned virtues. Accordingly, after dividing the virtues into primary and secondary ones, the authors analyze and compare the lists and definitions of secondary virtues in the view of each of these philosophers with those of others. The findings of this study demonstrate that the greatest similarities between the views of Ibn Miskawayh, Khwājah Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī, and Ḥakīm J‘afar Kashfī pertain to the virtue of wisdom and its related virtues. However, there are some relatively noteworthy differences among them regarding bravery, piety, and justice. For example, regarding piety, there is some disagreement between the views of Ibn Miskawayh and Ṭūsī; nevertheless, Ḥakīm Kashfī provides a different list of secondary virtues in comparison to the other two philosophers and oftentimes discusses piety in unity with economic and sexual self-discipline. The list and definitions of secondary virtues in relation to justice are completely similar to each other in the views of Khwājah Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī and Kashfī; however, Ibn Miskawayh’s list of justice-related secondary virtues contains 13 items more than those of the other two philosophers. Manuscript profile
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        2 - A Study of Multiplicity of the Category of Substance in Khwājah Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī
        Mahdi Dasht Bozorgi Mohammad Ismail Abdollahi Mohammad Karaminia
        Khwājah Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī has sometimes provided two different views regarding a scientific problem, one following the method of the people of kalam and the other following the method of philosophers. At first sight, one might assume that Ṭūsī is making contradictory co More
        Khwājah Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī has sometimes provided two different views regarding a scientific problem, one following the method of the people of kalam and the other following the method of philosophers. At first sight, one might assume that Ṭūsī is making contradictory comments; however, an analysis of his discussions reveal that such contradictions are only superficial and can be explained justifiably within the framework of his general system of philosophy. One of such contradictory cases pertains to the category of substance. In his works on logic, similar to Peripatetic philosophers, Ṭūsī considers substance to be a category or genus of genera; however, he deemed of substance as a secondary intelligible in his Tajrīd al-i‘tiqād. The present paper aims to clarify this view of the multiplicity of the category of substance. Then, in order to judge its legitimacy, the authors pose some possibilities and finally introduce one of the views which seems to be compatible with reality as their own standpoint. Through referring to Ṭūsī’s words and considering his social and academic position during his time, when philosophers were under huge attacks by mutikallimun, as well as given his moderate, truth-loving, and academic character, the authors demonstrate that this contradiction is superficial rather than real. Following the library method, this research was conducted based on a thorough study of Ṭūsī’s works. Nevertheless, the researchers also took the views of his commentators into consideration when necessary. Manuscript profile
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        3 - A Study of the Philosophical Elements of Platonic-Plotinian Tradition in Khwājah Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī’s Philosophy
        Seyed Morteza  Honarmand
        After the rise of Islam, philosophy and wisdom in Iran and in other corners of the world of Islam were united with Greek philosophy and interacted with it through the Translation Movement. Khwājah Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī was of the prominent thinkers of the world of Islam who More
        After the rise of Islam, philosophy and wisdom in Iran and in other corners of the world of Islam were united with Greek philosophy and interacted with it through the Translation Movement. Khwājah Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī was of the prominent thinkers of the world of Islam who became familiar with Greek philosophy and enriched it in the light of his innovations through the Peripatetic Philosophy and the works of Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā. Now, the question is which of the philosophical elements of Greek wisdom, particularly the Platonic-Plotinian tradition, is more visible in Ṭūsī’s philosophical-kalāmī thoughts. This study, which was carried out following a descriptive-analytic method and through exploring Ṭūsī’s works, concludes that this presence and similarity have emerged in different forms, including: 1) complete acceptance of Greek views without any change though with some displacement of Greek views, such as the most logical problems, the discussion of the ten-fold categories, the four-fold causes, and classifications of sciences; 2) completion, change, and addition of some arguments for demonstrating the previous views, such as the problem of impossibility of endless chain, immateriality of the soul, proving the Necessary, oneness of the Necessary, impossibility of the emanation of many from the one, union of the intellect and intelligible, and the substantial nature of archetypes, and 3) the change of the content and nature of Greek views while preserving their old names, such as Platonic Ideas. Manuscript profile
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        4 - God’s Will in Ṭūsī, Mullā Ṣadrā, and ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī
        Armin Mansouri Ali Alahbedashti
        The howness of God’s Will is one of the problems that has provoked a lot of discussion in the field of theology. Although all philosophers have accepted God’s Will as a Divine Attribute, there are several disagreements in its interpretation. The purpose of this paper is More
        The howness of God’s Will is one of the problems that has provoked a lot of discussion in the field of theology. Although all philosophers have accepted God’s Will as a Divine Attribute, there are several disagreements in its interpretation. The purpose of this paper is to investigate, compare, and evaluate the views of Khwājah Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī, Mullā Ṣadrā, and ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī in terms of the semantics, origin, and ontology of God’s Will. Ṭūsī maintains that will is the same as motive, which is the same as knowledge of the goodness of act, and thus believes in God’s essential will as an essential attribute. Mullā Ṣadrā also adds the sameness of love with will to the sameness of the knowledge of goodness of act with act and introduces will as an essential attribute. Moreover, he justifies the Infallible Imam’s narrations regarding the sameness of will with act by changing its meaning from having the intention to perform an act to the making and changing of its level from essence to the level of actual existents. However, ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī views the identity of free will with the knowledge of the best system as a verbal conflict and a merely different denomination. He disagrees with equating free will with any essential attribute (such as love) other than knowledge. Thus he maintains that free will is not an essential attribute but is, rather, abstracted from the level of act and is one of its attributes. He also introduces the essence of an act that occurs in the outside or the presence of perfect cause for the act as its source of abstraction. It seems that ٬Allāmah’s change of ontological view of free will and considering it an actual attribute in justifying rational constraints are more accurate than regarding it as an essential attribute without paying attention to the conceptual difference between free will and knowledge and love, which has been propounded by Ṭūsī and Mullā Ṣadrā. Manuscript profile
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        5 - Etymology of Fourth Dimension in the View of Muslim Mutikallimūn (Abū Isḥāq Naẓẓām, Ibn al-Rāwandī, Abū Sahl ‘Abbād, and Muḥaqiq Ṭūsī)
        Mahdi Assadi
        The fourth dimension is one of the problems that have left the borderlines of philosophy behind and are now among the main concerns of physicists. However, the accurate background and history of this view are still clouded. The roots of the fourth dimension can be trace More
        The fourth dimension is one of the problems that have left the borderlines of philosophy behind and are now among the main concerns of physicists. However, the accurate background and history of this view are still clouded. The roots of the fourth dimension can be traced back to the works and ideas of some thinkers of the Middle Ages, such as Anselm, in Western philosophy, although there is no explicit reference in this regard in their works. The roots of the fourth dimension have also been found in the works of Mullā Ṣadrā in Iranian philosophical society. This paper aims to demonstrate that there are some clearly explicit statements about the fourth dimension in the works of Khwājah Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī in the Islamic world before Mullā Ṣadrā. The author has found no direct statement in this respect in first-hand sources; however, some ideas have been attributed in second-hand sources to some of the mutikallimūn of the Islamic world, including Naẓẓām, Ibn Rāwandī, and ‘Abbād, that focus on four-dimensionalism. Following a historical approach, this paper has compiled the views of these thinkers and analyzed them based on a rational approach. Manuscript profile
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        6 - The Role of Religious Beliefs of Khwajah Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī in his Association with and Dissociation from the Ismā‘īlīs
        Seyyed Mohsen  Hosseini Einullah  Khademi Hoorieh Shojaee Baghini Mohammad Vahid Samimi
        A collection of factors underlay Khwajah Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī’s association with and dissociation from the Ismā‘īlī sect. This paper aims to disclose the role of his religious beliefs in his interactions with this religious sect. Ṭūsī’s education was completed in an atmosp More
        A collection of factors underlay Khwajah Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī’s association with and dissociation from the Ismā‘īlī sect. This paper aims to disclose the role of his religious beliefs in his interactions with this religious sect. Ṭūsī’s education was completed in an atmosphere of Twelver Shi‘ite philosophy, but in his youth he was also disenchanted with the existing imitative beliefs and dogmatic emphasis on extrinsic features of Sharī‘ah. This led him to develop an interest in some Ismā‘īlī teachings such as their attention to the esoteric meaning of religious texts and join this sect in response to their invitation. Of course, the undesirable conditions in the political-religious geography of the east of the Islamic world had also limited Ṭūsī’s choices. Nevertheless, based on some historical reports of the time of his relationship with the Ismā‘īlīs and some of his works that had been written in conformity with Ismā‘īlī ideas, it can be said that he had some ideological disagreements with them after joining the sect. His reaction after his separation from the Ismā‘īlīs, whom he has introduced as atheists and non-Muslims in his Kalāmī books, demonstrate his ideological conflicts with this sect. In fact, Ṭūsī joined the Ismā‘īlīs in his youth because of his religious ideas and, later, separated from them for the same reason. He revealed his ideological opposition to them in his Kalāmī written works. Manuscript profile
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        7 - A Study of the Historical Development of the Notion of Platonic-Aristotelean Agape and Love in Fārābī and Ṭūsī (In the Realm of Human Relationships)
        Fereshteh Abolhassani Niaraki
        The present study provides a description and analysis of the historical development of the notion of Aristotelean-Platonic agape (love) in the philosophical thoughts of Fārābī and Khwājah Nasīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī. Following a historical method, the author deals with the reason More
        The present study provides a description and analysis of the historical development of the notion of Aristotelean-Platonic agape (love) in the philosophical thoughts of Fārābī and Khwājah Nasīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī. Following a historical method, the author deals with the reasons behind this development in addition to describing it. The discussion of friendship (agape) in Aristotle’s philosophy is propounded in his Nichomachean Ethics, where some traces of Platonic notion are also observable. This discussion was transformed in Islamic Philosophy in certain respects, including the variety of the beloved (and the most beloved), individualistic or socialist aspect, and selfishness or selflessness aspect. Regarding the variety of the beloved, the discussion has moved from virtue-based friendship (agape) to the love of the Wise (God). As to its range, one can observe a change of dialog form social-political friendship to agape as an internal characteristic with individual and social effects. Moreover, it has moved beyond selfishness and selflessness and, in conformity with the principle of congruence, reached the love from Him (Godly). The influential views of such thinkers as Plotinus; the role of religion, culture, and gnosis, and the ideas of Ibn Sīnā, Ibn Miskawayh, and Suhrawardī are of great importance in explaining this development. The particular philosophical and Kalāmī principles of Fārābī and Ṭūsī as well as some of their ethical views are the most important factors in the interpretation of the underlying reasons of the mentioned development. Manuscript profile